Bryn Mawr College

Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr
College
History Faculty Research and Scholarship

2002

The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién,
1735-50
Ignacio Gallup-Diaz
Bryn Mawr College, igallupd@brynmawr.edu

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.brynmawr.edu/history_pubs
Part of the History Commons
Custom Citation
Gallup-Díaz, Ignacio. "The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, 1735-50." Ethnohistory 49, no. 2 (2002): 281-317.

This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. http://repository.brynmawr.edu/history_pubs/14
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.

History

The Spanish Attempt To Tribalize the Darién, 1739-1750*
Ignacio Gallup-Diaz
Bryn Mawr College
Creating a “Darién Tribe” From the Tule People1
This paper examines Spanish-indigenous interactions in eastern Panamá after 1735, when
imperial administrators struggled to re-establish control there following a destructive Indian rebellion in
1727-8. Reacting to heightened international tensions, the Spanish crown ordered officials in Panamá
City to pacify the Darién frontier in order to head off foreign incursions into a region that had
traditionally served as a haven for its enemies. A tenuous administrative system had put down fragile
roots in the Darién, although the rebellion exposed its weaknesses and ushered in a seven-year period of
colonial neglect. Spanish actions to incorporate the Tule into a workable colonial structure began in 1635
and were intertwined with, and reliant on, the members of a family named Carrisoli. In the early
seventeenth century the activities of Julián Carrisoli de Alfaraz were central to the missionizing activities
of a band of Dominican friars, and at the end of the century Julián’s son Luis provided the local Spanish
defense against the incursions of the buccaneers and the short-lived colony of the Scots.2 Following Luis
Carrisoli’s death in 1701 the Spanish position in the Darién eroded, and the rebellion of 1727 exposed the
grave problem the region posed to the Spanish imperial system. This paper analyses the activities of a
new generation of officials, men such as Dionisio Martínez de la Vega and Dionisio de Alsedo, as they
struggled to “re-conquer” the eastern portion of the isthmus after 1735.
The Panamanian isthmus, a place so vital to Spanish endeavors at the start of the conquest of the
Americas, had become a troubled frontier zone by the close of the sixteenth century. The Spanish
conquistadors, having arrived in the Darién at the end of 1502, quickly established the isthmus as a
strategic springboard for their various expeditions of conquest and exploration. In 1513 Vasco Núñez de
Balboa, with the assistance of indigenous allies, discovered the trans-isthmian route connecting the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Balboa derived fame, but little profit from his discovery, and in 1519 he fell
victim to a judicial murder at the hands of his rival, Pedrarias Davila, governor of Castilla de Oro.3
Pedrarias presided over the plundering of the isthmus, during which the indigenous population of central
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Panamá declined precipitously.4 After the conquest of the Inka state in Peru in 1532 the Spanish
population of Panamá diminished, as that richer realm siphoned off unattached adventurers. Furthermore,
economic and social development in New Spain to the north and Peru to the south relegated early Panamá
to the position of a tertiary economy reliant upon shipping and the transportation of goods from other
realms across the isthmus.5 By the latter part of the sixteenth century English and French pirates,
recognizing the value of attacking the Spanish empire at its vulnerable isthmian chokepoint, stepped up
their disruptive attacks, establishing a durable model for future intruders by coordinating their activities
with the region’s indigenous people and African rebels.6
By the start of the seventeenth century, Spanish officials had established colonial rule over the
central isthmus; decimated, converted, and subdued that region’s Indians; and secured a negotiated peace
with the rebel African communities. While the isthmus was more or less secure at its center, its eastern
border proved impossible to seal off from foreign attack and intrusion. Spanish efforts were directed at
controlling and converting the region’s indigenous population, and throughout the seventeenth century
Julian and Luis Carrisoli, as maestres de campo of the province of the Darién, pursued a gradualist policy
of indigenous pacification through the selective co-optation of local indigenous leaders. Spanish officials
came to measure colonial success in eastern Panamá through assessing the number of client Tule leaders
who were willing to pledge allegiance, and provide services to, the Spanish crown.
The Carrisolis’ modest goal was to have at their disposal a reliable party of men who could
muster indigenous militia troops to defend the colony whenever the isthmus was threatened. However, in
their communications with their superiors the Carrisolis described the indigenous polity with which they
interacted in a way that made it conform to Spanish preconceptions, and placed on their own shoulders
the mantle of Euro-native warlords. The officials depicted themselves as the controllers of a “tribal”
entity that the Spanish termed the “reduced Darién Indians.” This group, presumably, was comprised of
peoples who had voluntarily removed themselves from their native realms and had placed themselves
under Spanish administration at reducciones, or “reduced towns.” Following Neil L. Whitehead, I term
this process tribalization, and see it as one in which European actors and indigenous leaders exercised an
equal agency as they re-imagined, and worked to create, a new Indian polity.7
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Prior to 1728, Spanish officials assumed that the Carrisolis’ colonial policy was bringing ever
greater numbers of the Tule Indians to the Christian faith and placing them in hispanicized towns under
the administration of Christian Tule officials whom the Spanish termed capitanes. The Spanish believed
that these “reduced” Indians comprised a distinct social, cultural, and political entity called the “Darién
Indians.” However, the “tribe” that the Spanish thought of as the “reduced Darién Indians” existed, at
best, in the minds of the imperial administrators. Even so, through their rhetorical creation of a colonial
Tule polity in their official correspondences, the Carrisolis succeeded in establishing themselves as the
most important chieftains of the imaginary tribal entity nonetheless. The capitanes whom they had
endorsed, on the other hand, were in no senses imaginary, and, as the Spanish would soon learn to their
peril, these men were agents capable of independent action.
The imperial competition that characterized the later seventeenth century actually served as an
incubator for new “tribal” leaders, since the Carrisolis' heightened need for indigenous allies led them to
elevate growing numbers of self-proclaimed Tule leaders to the position of capitan in order to ensure the
defense of the isthmus. The “reduced Darién Indians” developed throughout the century as a unit
characterized by the presence of a multitude of “tribal” chiefs who ruled over few actual Indian
constituents. Although the Carrisolis had achieved some success in crafting a hierarchy amongst the new
indigenous leaders whom Spanish officials were incorporating into the nascent colonial administrative
system, there was nothing about that tenuous system that required that a Carrisoli be present for it to hold
together. A Tule village leader simply needed a modicum of local support and the ear of a Spanish
official or a foreign intruder in order to lay claim to a position of regional leadership within the province.
The Spanish expected that by attaining a secure administrative understanding with one, or at most
a small group of Tule sub-chiefs, the Darién could be administered, Christianized, and subdued. This
expectation, which Spanish officials believed was supported by the information they had gained from the
activities of the first generation of explorers and exploiters, was the bedrock upon which their
seventeenth-century efforts in the region were grounded. As Mary W. Helms has shown, the Indian
polities of pre-contact Panamá were in fact dominated by regional chieftains who expressed their cultural
power through the control of long-distance trade networks and the production of items for exchange.8
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However, the ferocity of the conquest, the profundity of the native demographic collapse, and the
stringency of Spanish economic exploitation destroyed the social system that had supported chiefly
indigenous power. Eighteenth-century Spanish officials planned their strategies as if nothing had
changed since the time of Balboa, but, in reality, very little was the same. The mistaken belief that the
peoples of the Darién continued to be dominated by all-powerful regional chieftains was not unique to the
Spanish. It was shared by the various English, Scottish and French intruders who actively sought
diplomatic alliances with the indigenous leaders whom they believed to be the region's indigenous lords.
Euro-Tule interactions between 1640 and 1740 were carried out under this particular misapprehension, and the result was the creation of a group of self-conscious regional chieftains who, in
conjunction with Spanish administrators, worked to create a unified “tribe” of Indians, in accordance with
the Europeans’ understanding, with themselves as its leaders. These newly-emerging indigenous leaders
labored to make their political arrangements recognizable to the Spanish, in order to integrate themselves,
when such a strategy was prudent, into the Spanish colonial administration. Recognizing that power
could be gained through the use of the leverage that a close relationship with the Spanish colonial
administration would bring, these Tule leaders brandished their staves of office, medals, awards, and
royal commissions like talismans.9
Several Tule village leaders attempted to consolidate regional power-bases that were predicated
upon their monopolization of Indian interactions with Spanish officials.10 In addition, these and other
indigenous leaders made diplomatic overtures to the non-Spanish intruders to the Darién. The French and
English buccaneers who operated in the region between 1670 and 1690, and the Scottish intruders who
arrived between 1698 and 1700, all found willing Tule allies. In the 1730s, the period under scrutiny in
this paper, it was the Spanish who attempted to exert a modicum of colonial control over a region that
they had recently ignored. Spanish officials from Panamá City worked to construct a rejuvenated colonial
system by negotiating a devolution of power upon a generation of Tule leaders, men who had acquired
considerable skills through their adept management of diplomatic relationships with the various
competing outsiders.
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This paper examines the manner in which the Spanish attempt to “re-conquer” the Darién through
a policy of peace encouraged the emergence of several new “tribal” Tule leaders. These men judiciously
apprised the strategic reality presented to them by the Spanish maneuvers to re-establish an imperial
administration in the region. Through the manipulation of rhetoric and colonial politics, they strove to
consolidate some Tule villagers into what the Spanish would recognize as an Indian “tribe.” Their actions
would meet with compliance, resistance, and, at times, indifference by the inhabitants of the communities
of the Darién. Taken together however, the emerging chiefs, the Tule villagers, and the European
intruders took part in a recoverable historical process that has not yet been described accurately, or in
detail.
The Structure of Peace in the Darién
A royal order of 26 February 1735 called for officials in the Americas to oversee the conquest of
the Darién. It prompted the viceroy to confer with the new presidente of the audiencia of Panamá,
Dionisio Martínez de la Vega, on 20 June 1735. Martínez informed his superior that he would need 500
trained Spanish soldiers to put an end to warfare in the Darién.11 Such an extravagant complement of
men, arms, and materiel was not forthcoming from the viceroy, however, and the situation festered until
April 1737, when Martínez offered the hostile Indians a general pardon in return for the cessation of the
attacks against the Spanish.12
A group of Tule caciques responded favorably to Martínez’s offer of amnesty in the fall of 1738,
the result, the presidente triumphantly opined, of two years of constant pressure, which included the
destruction of the rebels’ means of subsistence and retributive attacks by tribal Chocó warriors allied to
Spain.13 On the other hand, the spokesman for the caciques themselves later reported that they had
chosen peace over continued hostilities because several epidemics and natural disasters had emiserated
their people, making further resistance difficult, if not impossible.14
Individual Tule leaders made positive initial responses to the amnesty, but Martínez informed
them that he sought a grander settlement, one that would encompass all of the “Darién Indians.” A
cacique named Felipe Merina informed Martínez that this goal, however worthy, would not be easily

5

achieved. The Indian stated that as far as he was concerned, “the peace could only be for the Río
Chucunaque, of which he was head. He simply did not possess the power to make peace for the entire
province.”15 Martínez responded by giving the caciques with whom he had had contact an ultimatum:
they had six weeks to decide whether to be represented by a single cacique who would come forward and
sign a comprehensive peace treaty with him, or else Martínez would re-commence hostilities against
them.16 The six-week interval would be ample, he assumed, to allow the leaders to order their affairs and
agree to the peace.
The presidente’s desire to deal with a single, powerful cacique no doubt led to competition
amongst autonomous Tule leaders to stand as the single man who would be recognized by Martínez as the
paramount leader of a substantial portion of the Darién’s Indians.17 Throughout the seventeenth century,
long-term Spanish-Tule contact had resulted in the opening up of leadership opportunities for Tule men
who wished to put themselves forward as self-styled chieftains, and Spanish strategic needs had now
forced upon the polity the selection of a paramount chief to act as spokesman and guarantor of a
comprehensive peace treaty.18 The Tule man who emerged as the supreme tribal cacique was a chieftain
named Juan Chani or Sanni. This man, also known as Tunchile, had played a central, destructive role in
the Indian uprising of 1727-8. However, it now appeared that he had decided to take up a part on the new
tribal stage that Spanish colonialism offered him.19
On 31 October 1738 Sanni journeyed to Panamá City to iron out the peace with the presidente,
making clear that although he was escorted solely by Marzelo del Castillo of Molineca and his interpreter,
Pedro Santiago Cabrejo, he was, in fact, the ruler of an Indian nation numbering some five hundred men,
women, and children.20 The cacique made an important point immediately, stating that the term ‘rebel’
was not the proper one to be used in relation to his people, since they had merely provided assistance to
certain individuals in distress. Adopting a more conciliatory note, Sanni then conveyed to the presidente
his desire for peace, which he promised was the general wish of his people.21
The treaty that Sanni negotiated aimed to do nothing less than effect a total re-organization of
Tule administrative life under a rejuvenated Spanish administration. The provisions of the treaty revealed
that Juan Sanni and other now-lesser Tule leaders had wielded considerable power during its negotiation.
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The first protocol of the pact, for example, included one of many Spanish concessions to the Tule,
granting that “the people of the northern band, who have always lived dispersed, are granted the liberty to
remain that way for the next ten years.”22 Therefore, while on one level representing a Spanish attempt to
impose a form of colonial dominion over a newly-tribalized Tule people, in reality the pact, rather than
reflecting an imposition of Spanish power, instead signaled an acceptance by the Spanish of messy
current realities, something especially evident in Martínez’s dispensing with the consistently failed policy
of expanding the reducciones.
The third protocol was even more remarkable. It stated that no Indian would be “pressured or
forced by violence to accept the Christian faith.”23 The Spanish here accepted a weakened policy of
voluntary missionization in which Indians who had already been converted would continue to live under
religious discipline at the existing reducciones, while those who chose not to reduce themselves would be
left in peace, so long as they did not commit acts of violence or rebellion against the Spanish
administration.24
In addition, the treaty formalized the gift-exchange that the Tule leaders called the paniquiris and
moras, which, the text stated, “had been given to the Indians for the longest time.”25 Although a highlevel investigation of the crown’s ledgers had failed to find the official accounts for the previous
presents,26 the gifts were proclaimed to be valid, extra-judicial grants.27 In an act that displayed a deft
rhetorical sleight-of-hand, the paniquiris and moras were re-defined as a type of clothing, and the pact
ordered the presidentes to continue providing these traditional items of exchange, since the King and
Consejo both greatly approved of clothes being given to the Indians “to enhance their decency.”28
The treaty-making Tule leaders clearly extracted every concession they could, even dictating that
only Jesuit priests would be allowed to enter the Darién and tend to the reducciones.29 In addition, the
pact stipulated that no persons of African descent would be allowed to enter the Darién without the
expressed permission of the principal cacique.30 The fifth protocol dealt with the province’s leadership
structure, and as such was perhaps the treaty’s most vital provision. It stated in simple language, that
“due to problems with the teniente generales in the past, the Indians will be ruled only by their own
caciques, and all caciques are subordinate to Juan Sanni. All of these native leaders, including Sanni, are,
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in turn, subordinate to the governor of the province.”31 Martínez’s treaty, therefore, legalized a new tribal
structure of rulership for the province, covering leaders from the highest cacique to the smallest riverine
chief. The provisions covering the tribe’s system of overlordship were detailed, and supplemented by the
remarkable statement that “every river shall have a captain, whom the governor must approve in order for
him to hold that office.”32
Strategic constraints during a time of heightened British-Spanish pressures had forced officials to
negotiate the tribalization of the Tule, a process that they had previously assumed would occur as the
result of a long-term interactions and confrontations that would comprise a sequence of contact, conquest,
and missionization. The treaty of 1738 changed the pace of this development, and it was negotiated and
signed principally because all of the players needed the peace that it promised. Martínez got peace from
the pact; Sanni got the leadership of a tribe; and the royal Consejo de Indias believed that the treaty would
provide regional security as the crown prepared for a war in the Caribbean. With so many factors acting
in its favor, the pact received royal approval on 27 October 1739.33
Once the tribalization process in the Darién had gathered some momentum, it suddenly took on a
contagious quality. When Felipe Uriñaquichu, the leader of the Tule living at the Gulf of Urabá, learned
in late 1741 of the presidente’s audacious pact, he approached Martínez and signed an almost identical
agreement.34 The tribalization fever had yet to fully run its course, for a party of Frenchmen, exbuccaneers who also lived at the Gulf of Urabá, chose this opportunity to seek the crown’s pardon and
themselves become signatories to the comprehensive treaty. These long-outlawed men, ruled by a
European cacique of their own choosing named Santos Bullico, became vassals of the Spanish crown and
acquired legal standing as a chartered buffer community within a tribal Darién.35
With the taming of the French levantados, Dionisio Martínez de la Vega’s attempt to bring order
to the chaotic Indian country appeared to have achieved tangible results. As Spain prepared for a possible
war against the British, the Darién could be removed from the crown’s list of the most problematic
trouble spots. The presidente clearly had engineered an acceptable short-term solution, but only time
would tell whether Martínez’s attempt to tribalize the Darién by treaty would prove a long-term success.
Although Martínez brimmed with optimism, the future would almost certainly be fraught with perils for
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him. For Juan Sanni and, to a lesser extent, Felipe Uriñaquichu, had been granted remarkable
administrative powers within the suddenly colonial Darién.
The novelty of this arrangement in the Darién upset the fragile political equilibrium that Spanish
officials had established at other isthmian frontier zones. The Spanish effort to extend the frontier
eastward to the Darién was not welcomed by those indigenous leaders who had made their careers as
representatives of colonial authority on the Chepo frontier. In April 1739, soon after the treaty had been
negotiated with Juan Sanni, the cacique of the Indians of Chepo paid Martínez a visit, and the presidente
reported to the crown in a letter of 27 May 1739 that
the cacique Don Ventura showed himself on this occasion to be most
displeased. Having stayed with me here for several days he was treated
with the greatest respect as he is one of the chieftains who controls a
major force of the Indians. At the frontier, by the fort of Chepo, he took
his leave of me understanding that he had been very well treated by me.36
Tribal leaders from what previously had been the sole frontier region near Chepo clearly preferred that the
Darién remain a marginalized Indian country. Since any changes in its status and, most importantly, in
the status of its leaders, could have a direct effect on their lives and livelihoods, these men preferred the
status quo.
The Jesuit Entrada
The Spanish-Tule peace treaty of 1738 had stipulated, in accordance with Indian wishes, that only
Jesuit missionaries would be given leave to enter the Darién. Since the eastern Panamá frontier straddled
separate imperial jurisdictions, the royal cédula which placed the King’s imprimatur on the treaty ordered
that the provinces of Quito and Santa Fe were each to contribute men to the effort. Jesuits from Quito
would missionize the northern tribe of the Tule people, whose territory stretched from the central
mountains to the South Sea, while the missionaries from Santa Fe would minister to the Indians of the
southern tribe, who lived on either side of the Gulf of Urabá.
In March 1741 the Father General of the Jesuit order, Father Francisco Retz, wrote a letter to the
provincial of Quito, Baltazar de Moncada. The royal cédula of 27 March 1740, he insisted, required
Moncada to dispatch missionaries from his province into the Darién.37 However, Moncada had a full
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plate of issues before him at the time he received Retz’s letter, the most important being the stabilization
of Quito’s Jesuit establishment after the recent turmoil it had suffered during the visitation of Padre
Andrés de Zárate.38 Moncada was unable to act on the urgings of his superior, and the matter fell to his
successor, Carlos Brentan.39 Brentan, having served in the missions along the Amazon River for over
fourteen years, placed a high premium on Jesuit missionary activity in the province. Upon assuming the
office, he made a personal visita of the province, traveling the length and breadth of the enormous region
in 1743.40 After this undertaking the new provincial selected two men to missionize the Darién, and
escorted them northward to the isthmus. His coffers in Quito being empty, Brentan knew that he would
have to ask the audiencia of Panamá to allocate the funds necessary to support the missionaries.
Accompanied by Fathers Joaquín Álvarez and Claudio Escobar,41 Brentan made the difficult trip though
the forests of Barbacoas, the Chocó, and the Darién. The Jesuits completed their journey to Panamá City
on 12 February 1743.42 Less than a week after their arrival, Brentan presented himself before the
audiencia and the new presidente, Dionisio de Alsedo.43
Brentan made an earnest plea for the support of his companions who were to labor in the Darién,
arguing that the two men would each require 300 pesos per annum, sums which the Jesuit colegios of
Quito and Panamá could not provide. On 23 March 1744 presidente Alsedo convened the junta de
hacienda, at which expenditures would be discussed. The presidente’s representation summarized
Brentan’s earlier petition, and underscored the vital necessity of missionary activity in ensuring the
security of the isthmus. To clinch his argument Alsedo provided informes written by Captains Félix
Muñoz de Guzmán and Manuel de Arago, governors of the Darién, and by the protector of the Indians,
Joaquín Balcárcel de Miranda that described the tenuous Spanish position in the Darién.44 Under the
weight of all the detailed testimony, the audiencia shouldered the burden of financially supporting the two
Jesuit missionaries. The junta unanimously voted to provide the priests with their salaries, and enjoined
them
to teach the evangelical law to the inhabitants of that province and
marchland, reducing them through the sweetness of those doctrines to the
knowledge of the one true God and the mysteries of our holy, apostolic,
and Roman Catholic faith, and awakening them from the blindness of
their idolatry and giving them the clear light of the perfect religion.45
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The few Spaniards serving in government or military positions in eastern Panamá, however, were
gripped by doubt and confusion in October of 1744.46 At the time the pair of Jesuits entered the region
the principal settlement in the Darién was a small military fort at El Real de Santa María, located at the
junction of the Tuíra and Chucunaque rivers.47 Upon reaching El Real padres Joaquín Álvarez and
Claudio Escobar found themselves drawn into a petty struggle which threatened to doom their endeavor
before they had actually begun the task. The cause of the trouble was a secular priest named Juan de
Pomar y Burgos, who was being held against his will at the fort when the Jesuits got there.48 Joaquín
Álvarez immediately went to work to set the situation to rights. He calmed frayed Spanish tempers by
proposing that the jailed priest, and the troublesome comisionario who had been dispatched highhandedly to retrieve and punish him, leave the fort of El Real in his custody, and that they make their way
together back to Panamá City. The priest assured the men that he would convince Alsedo not to delve
any further into the matter, and that any questionable activities which the comisionario had carried out in
the Darién would be ignored.
Having calmed the Spaniards, Álvarez then worked to alleviate Indian fears. He traveled to
Yavisa and preached the gospel to the Indians he found there, bringing the son of the most important man
of that small settlement to El Real for baptism. Having established this small, yet hopeful, foundation,
Álvarez journeyed to Panamá City on his mediatory errand.49 When he returned to the Darién, Álvarez
became convinced that the two Jesuits who were slated to work near the Gulf of Urabá could expect
trouble. He learned that the Frenchmen living there had informed the Indians that the Spanish priests had
come to the region to despoil the earth so that the Indians would be deprived of food, the better to enslave
them and subject them to tyranny. The Frenchmen were to have warned the Darién Indians that “if they
admit[ted] the Jesuits they will do in the Darién what they had done in ... Paraguay which was to make
themselves the despotic masters of the entire province, holding the Indians as vassals.”50 These
comments illustrate that the different inhabitants of the Darién were evaluating the meaning of the Jesuit
entrada into their lands, a process that had begun prior to the actual arrival of the missionaries.51
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The Jesuits made strategically-located Yavisa their base of operations among the Tule, and
Álvarez reported that upon his return there the young man whom he baptized two months earlier
welcomed him to the town by kneeling, praising the Lord, “and acting as if he were the most ancient of
Christians.”52 The convert assisted in the indoctrination of the ten armed men and their women and
children who resided at the river, and none of the villagers showed the slightest hostility, allowing him to
preach, offer gifts, and to say the mass. The Jesuit, after baptizing nine young boys, reported that their
families repaid him with hospitality and kindness, and “[t]he Indians offered [him] things, of the kind that
they partook of in their own houses, which, although they were of the most rustic sort, such as bananas
and monkey, [he] accepted with the highest appreciation.”53
After this success, Álvarez sent various kindly-worded messages to Juan Sanni in the hope of
gaining entry into the cacique’s lands in the remote upper-Chucunaque region. Sanni rebuffed all of these
overtures, leading Álvarez to conclude that Sanni, “though a friend in name, had been painted an enemy
by his actions.”54 Although the direct route to the man named in the treaty as the supreme Tule leader had
been obstructed by that Indian’s stubborn rejection of the faith, Álvarez set off on a second path, opening
friendly relations with the man known as Sanni’s brother, capitán Juan de Dios. It is unclear whether Juan
de Dios and Juan Sanni were actually biological brothers, or whether their relationship was a political or
an adoptive one. To Álvarez, however, they clearly seemed to be the sons of the same mother.
The Jesuit claimed that several meetings were all that were required for him to teach capitán Juan
de Dios the benefits of the Catholic faith and a Christian life. Following these encounters, Álvarez
convinced the Indian leader to leave behind his pagan ways.55 By forging such a close relationship with
Álvarez, Juan de Dios had stepped from out of the shadows, and from now forward would become a
major force in the new, colonial politics of the Darién province. Though he had been present at most of
the meetings that formalized the Hispano-Tule peace, Juan de Dios was not recorded as having said
anything at those momentous occasions. He was recognized as one among the many lieutenants of Juan
Sanni, and was duly rewarded with the honorific capitán after the signing of the treaty, but during
protector Balcárcel’s travels to the upper-Chucunaque in 1739 Juan de Dios had served solely as his
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guide. Again, he stood as a silent partner to those proceedings, appearing to all observers to be of far less
importance than the paramount leader of the Tule, Juan Sanni.56
The treaties gave the Jesuit missionaries the power to create new reducciones, settlements whose
leaders would be tethered to Spanish lines of patronage, funding, taxation, and defense. The novel
municipal and provincial power structure provided opportunities for self-styled village leaders like Juan
de Dios to enhance their power. The potential for instability was increased by the fact that Spanish
officials such as Alsedo were not particularly concerned that the benefits of office flow directly to those
men who had led Tule villages in the past. Not surprisingly, the Tule men to whom they would hand
provincial power needed to be, most especially, Christians willing to further Spanish aims. If Sanni were
willing to serve in this position, the honors of a Spanish American provincial cacique would be bestowed
upon him. If he hesitated, or, in the worst case, followed a path of resistance, the mantle of Tule
leadership would be stripped from him and placed on the shoulders of another man. Juan de Dios was
positioning himself to be that man, and was hoping to amass a large measure of the colonial spoils the
Spanish were offering to the Indian leaders of the Darién. Just how high he had set his sights would not
become clear, however, until the Jesuits set out to convert the man the Spanish had named as the first
Tule cacique, his “brother” Juan Sanni.
Prior to hearing from Sanni, and possibly to force his compliance, Álvarez had begun to groom
Juan de Dios to occupy a central position in a newly Christian hispanic Darién. Exactly what that
position would be depended entirely on the actions of Juan Sanni. In his letters to Alsedo, the Jesuit
upgraded capitán de Dios’s status, and began to name him as Sanni’s primary lieutenant. Álvarez also
commented glowingly upon the many sacrifices that Juan de Dios had already made for the faith. For
example, the Indian had expressed the wish to marry within the church and turn his back upon his other
wives, an act that Álvarez described as heroic. In addition, the capitán promised to provide the materials
and labor necessary for the building of the church at Yavisa. In stark contrast to his dealings with Juan de
Dios, Álvarez associated Juan Sanni with stubborn opposition to his aims, and resistance to the Catholic
faith. Though he had been a prominent leader of the region’s Indians who had been dealing with
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outsiders for nearly twenty years when the Jesuit missionaries arrived, Juan Sanni’s place at the center of
the Darién’s affairs was in peril.57
In late January protector Balcárcel called for the major Indian leaders to come to meet with him at
El Real. He had sent invitations to Felipe Uriñaquichu, the leader of the Tule of the northern tribe; the
cacique Juan Sanni; and the capitán of the recently-pardoned Frenchmen, Santos Bullico. Balcárcel
reported to Alsedo that on 25 January 1745 Santos Bullico and Francisco Fotoqua arrived at El Real “with
various Indians ... except for the cacique [Juan Sanni], who is gravely ill.”58 The men who arrived to take
counsel with Balcárcel at El Real were from the Urabá region, and while they told him what he wanted to
hear, they also sounded a note of caution. Although they were in accord with the provisions of the
treaties, and most willing and eager to accept the entry of the Jesuits, their people, however, might need a
little more time to get used to the new situation. The Frenchmen were the most blunt in the group, stating
that missionization of the Darién would not be easy going.59
At the close of their interview, the men conveyed a message from Juan Sanni to the protector in
which the cacique minimized his ailment, stating simply that he had been felled by a temporary, though
bothersome, illness.60 Sanni promised to relocate to the village of Tiligantí and bring enough of his
people there to form a town that could serve as a nucleus for the missionary operations of the Jesuit
priests. He ended his message by apologizing for having previously destroyed the village which had
formerly stood at the site, and offered to provide the Indians to be missionized by the Jesuits, as well as
the African labor necessary to build the places in which the priests would live and worship. In short,
Sanni was informing the Spanish secular authorities that he had changed face, and, in doing so, he
outmaneuvered Juan de Dios. That Indian leader had conveyed the news of the benefits of a Christian life
to his presumed brother Juan Sanni, and the cacique, perhaps pressured by the actions of the convert,
relented, finally issuing an invitation to the Jesuits to come and teach him about the faith.61
After receiving Sanni’s message, the two Jesuits decided that Álvarez should travel to
Chucunaque alone, while Escobar would remain in the Tuíra River region. Álvarez had clearly taken
charge of the mission.62 Álvarez entered Sanni’s lands with Juan de Dios and an interpreter, Juan de
Urive. Though “carried by providence” to Sanni’s remote home at a place called Arquiati, Álvarez lost
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the vision of one eye on the trip.63 Having reached the end of their journey, the three men were surprised
to find Juan Sanni extremely ill. He was, in fact, at death’s door.64 According to Álvarez, when they
entered his home Sanni informed the priest of his desire to use what little time remained to him in taking
care of his soul. The Jesuit quickly explained the central tenets of the faith to him, and after listening
intently, Sanni himself requested baptism.65
All of the observers who reported on Sanni’s deathbed conversion depicted it as one of the
transcendent moments in the history of the Spanish American empire. The baptism was a confirmation of
the Christian faith, a vindication of Spanish aims and ideals, a feather in the cap for the Jesuit missionary,
and a strategic victory for the presidente in Panamá City. Previously regarded by the Spanish as a
rebellious pagan chieftain with a penchant for trafficking with the enemy, Sanni was immediately
accorded a new status, akin to that bestowed upon the converted lords who ruled the European states that
had succeeded the Roman empire. The Spanish in Panamá believed that the sacrament had set in motion
a series of irresistible processes, all of which would benefit the Spanish crown. The Tule of the southern
tribe would follow Sanni into the Christian faith; the men would repudiate all but one of their multiple
wives; and the population would settle down in reduced towns as the priest desired. Álvarez’s labors had
brought to the faith a recalcitrant pagan whose dramatic conversion would usher in the pacification of this
troublesome region.
Sanni, of course, appeared in Álvarez’s and Alsedo’s accounts by means of messages that he
supposedly conveyed to Álvarez and the Protector of Indians and interim governor of the province,
Joaquín Balcárcel y Miranda. By the time Álvarez traveled from Yavisa to Arquiati to meet Sanni, the
cacique had become a powerless, prostrate figure on a cot, near death. According to Álvarez’s account,
Sanni even bestowed a blessing in his final wish, informing Álvarez that it was his desire that all of his
offices and titles should devolve upon his brother, Juan de Dios.
The cacique Juan Sanni then gave up the ghost, a mere six or seven minutes after having been
offered the sacrament of baptism. He was a Christian in the end.66 Because Sanni had died in the faith,
his named, Christian successor would be the man to provide the Spanish civil and ecclesiastical officials
with tangible proof that the Darién Indians had submitted to both the Christian faith and Spanish laws.
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Sanni’s successor was, of course, none other than Juan de Dios. The secondary figure that had stood in
the shadows during the negotiation of the peace in 1738 was now King Philip V’s highest ranking Indian
vassal in the province of the Darién.
Juan de Dios took advantage of the presence of the missionaries in order to enhance his own
position at Juan Sanni’s expense. Although Juan de Dios’s play for power was a risky one, in the end he
was perhaps most aided in his quest by epidemic disease, the result of the increased Spanish activity in
the Darién. At the time of the Jesuit’s entrada the Darién was in the punishing grip of viruelas, or
smallpox, and when Juan Sanni became one of the epidemic’s victims, his illness left a vacuum in the
Tule political structure. This vacuum occurred just at the time when relationships between Spanish
officials and Indian leaders were being increasingly formalized. The Christian Juan de Dios, already
consolidating a position with the new Jesuit power in the region, took full advantage of his “brother’s”
illness to monopolize the power the Spanish would confer on the indigenous leaders of a hispanicized
Darién.67
Celebrating the Fruits of Success
Presidente Alsedo soon celebrated the proof that the religious conquest was proceeding favorably,
announcing in a decree of 8 February that
just recently there has appeared at the dock here, in the royal piragua
which serves to transport food and supplies to the men quartered at the
forts in the Darién, the very Reverend Father Joaquín Álvarez, the
interpreter Juan de Urive, with Juan de Dios, brother of the cacique, his
woman Doña Thomasa, a son of the Captain named Juan Joseph, Don
Andrés Moreti, Lere and chief of the river of his name, and eight other
Indians of the said cacique’s jurisdiction, all baptized as Christians by
Father Álvarez.68
Juan de Dios came to Panamá City with several objectives in mind. He voiced them to Alsedo as
soon as the two met: he wished to present himself to the governor as a Christian; to have the succession of
his brother’s cacigazgo conferred upon him; to be named coronel of the militia troop of the Darién; and,
lastly, he wished to have the lere of Moreti named as capitán, in the position he himself would vacate
upon being named the cacique. Alsedo graciously received the Indian leaders who had come to Panamá
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City, made them aware that he considered them to be Christian vassals of the king of Spain, and
announced publicly that he deemed them all “worthy of distinction and respect.”69 The governor
welcomed Father Álvarez, Juan de Dios, and the cacique’s wife to eat at his table, and extended the
invitation to any others whom the Amerindians saw fit to join them.70
In addition, Alsedo covered the expenses the visitors might incur in the City, granting each of the
Indians two reales for each day that they were to be his guests. The cacique and his wife were each
granted an additional peso per day, “and the corresponding paniquiris and moras.”71 The codification of
the exchange of the paniquiri and mora signaled the development of a more complex relationship between
the Spanish administration and the tribal Indian leaders of the Darién. Following the peace process of
1738, the paniquiri and mora evolved into a method through which the Indians hispanicized the kind of
gift exchange that would originally have resolved a dispute between indigenous leaders. Although
Alsedo may have been ignorant of the fact, his predecessors had countenanced a cycle of exchange that
had created certain expectations on the part of the Indian leaders. If the Tule-Spanish relationship were to
exist on a firm footing, the process would need to be extended, and Alsedo’s unblinking order that the
payments be continued is evidence that he felt that Indian-Spanish relationships had achieved a new level
of stability and integration.
Juan de Dios showed himself to be extremely flexible in this new situation. accepting the cash
that the governor offered him as the payment of the paniquiri and mora, while he surely knew that in the
past these exchange items had always taken the form of linen goods. Though the original meaning of the
exchange of the paniquiri and mora was far removed from the simple use of cash to discharge a debt in
the manner in which Alsedo described, the cacique accepted the money graciously and without demur.
In a decree of the next day Alsedo named Juan de Dios coronel of the militia of the southern part
of the Darién, and head of the cacigazgo covering the same territory, with the same salary in that office as
had been granted to his recently dead brother. Juan de Dios followed this by ratifying the peace with the
Spanish. Then the Indian leader respectfully made four requests. After first thanking Father Álvarez for
bringing the Christian faith to him, Juan de Dios asked that only Jesuits be allowed to enter his lands,
since the Indians had grown accustomed to their care, and would be mistrustful of members of another
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religious order. His second request was that Don Félix Muñoz, who had been involved in the negotiations
with Sanni, be named commander general of the Darién, which was Sanni’s dying wish. Thirdly, Juan de
Dios asked that the protector of the Indians keep a ledger, which the capitanes could inspect at their
request, in which the Indians would sign and date the receipt of their respective salaries. This would
prevent the awkward situations which had arisen in the past in which capitanes had accepted what they
thought to have been gifts only to be rudely informed, when they had appeared to collect their salaries
later on, that such payment had already been disbursed. Finally, Juan de Dios requested that he be
allowed to receive his salary of thirty pesos for the month of February immediately, so that he could buy
stores and supplies while he was in Panamá City.72
These requests were relatively simple for Alsedo to handle; he demurred only on the second
point, which was a matter entirely in the hands of the Viceroy. The first request had already been agreed
to by the Crown in the royal cédula of March, 1740; and the third was an arrangement of administrative
efficiency whose value was evident to all. Regarding the final request, Alsedo not only disbursed Juan de
Dios’s salary, he also ordered that the other capitanes in his company be given a month’s salary while
they were in Panamá City.73
On 11 February the Bishop of the city, Don Juan de Casañada Velásquez y Salazar, confirmed the
Indians who had come in the company of Father Álvarez.74 After the bishop gave public certification to
the religious conversions of the leaders of Darién’s Indians, Panamá’s military establishment proceeded
to pay public homage to the new military officers of the Darién. The next day the capitán of the second
battalion of Grenadiers of the city of Panamá formed the battalion at the city’s plaza and the coronel of
the Darién’s militia was presented to the troops. The capitán read the cacique’s commission before the
assembled men and dignitaries, and at the close of the ceremony Juan de Dios was received by the troops
with great acclaim.75
Alsedo assented to Juan de Dios’s wishes regarding Andrés, the lere of Moreti, who was duly
named to the position of capitán which Juan himself had vacated to become the region’s cacique and
coronel. The copy of the decreto that named Andrés Ruiz a capitán of the militia provided graphic
evidence of the transitional nature of the arrangements being worked out for the Darién. The text stated

18

that Alsedo did “approve of the election and proposition made by the supplicant of the Lere de Moreti.”76
A line has scored through the words “Lere de Moreti,” in the document, apparently because the writer or
reciter realized that the Tule “lere” was the word for the ritual specialist of the pagan religion.
Immediately following the scored passage, the lere is re-named Andrés Ruiz, which may illustrate
Alsedo’s prevention of the scribe from utilizing the honorific by which the applicant had previously been
known.
On 13 February the secretary of the audiencia recorded several oaths administered by Governor
Alsedo and sworn to by Juan de Dios.77 Alsedo began by asking if Juan de Dios was a Christian and
faithful vassal of King Philip V, to which Juan de Dios replied, “Yes.” Following this admission, Juan de
Dios was brought to the governor’s private chapel, where a light was directed upon the crucifix at the
center of the room. The cacique was asked to swear three times to uphold the peace which had been
signed by his brother, to affirm that the Indians within his cacigazgo would reduce themselves to live in
Christian towns, to swear that he would obey all of the King’s commands, to defend the jurisdiction he
was being given, and, finally, to prevent the entry of foreign enemies into the region under his command.
To all of these requests he answered, solemnly, “Yes,” and swore the oath three times, in the end offering
to comply with its provisions to the very loss of his life.
In his trek to Panamá City with the Indian leaders, Father Álvarez provided the kind of pageant
which Dionisio de Alsedo y Herrera had expected. In less than one year the Jesuit could claim to have
single-handedly brought the greater part of the Indian population of eastern Panamá under Spanish
Christian administration. The new cacique of the Darién had been a guest at his table, and had, in
Alsedo’s private prayer room, sworn to defend the Christian faith, the Spanish crown, and the lands which
had been entrusted to him. Álvarez could convince himself that he had set in motion a drama akin to the
great conversions of the early church, in which pagan kings declared themselves and their people
followers and defenders of the church. For the time being, Alsedo could bask in the glory of believing
that he had converted the Darién, one of the empire’s most notorious costas bravas, into a pacified region
of the Spanish empire. It was a belief that would not be savored for very long.
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A Stark Change of Fortune
In June 1746 the Viceroy of the New Kingdom of Granada, Sebastián Eslava, requested from
Alsedo an account of the missionary activity which had taken place to date before he disbursed the
considerable sum of 600 pesos to the Jesuits working in the Darién. Governor Alsedo asked Pablo
Maroni, the rector of the Jesuit colegio of Panamá, to prepare an informe to send to the Viceroy. Maroni
had been a companion of Brentan’s, serving with him in the missions along the Amazon in the kingdom
of Quito, and Alsedo relied upon him as a knowledgeable and experienced source regarding missionary
affairs in his jurisdiction. Maroni’s report, dated 1 July 1746, was a frank and reasoned assessment of
missionary activity in the Darién.78
Maroni reported that rather than confine himself to the region of the Chucunaque, Claudio
Escobar had been assigned to work with the Indians of the Gulf of Urabá, where he attempted to persuade
the Tule leader Felipe Uriñaquichu to allow missionaries to enter the territory. There were immediate
problems. The Frenchmen residing in the area were furious with the chief for having admitted the Jesuits
in the first place, and soon put both the chief and the missionary to flight. The two eventually settled in
the town of Paya, where Escobar attempted to form a reducción with little success.79 Maroni reported that
large populations of Indians could not be concentrated in the two reducciones of Yavisa and Paya due to
the peste of viruelas, which was ravaging the entire province at the time.
In fact the fury of the pestilence led to the recall, in only the second year of their activity, of the
two original missionaries who had entered the Darién. The Jesuit missionary endeavor, which had begun
so triumphantly a year earlier, now faltered in the face of a devastating outbreak of disease.80 Fathers
Ignacio María Franciscis and Jacobo Walburger replaced Álvarez and Escobar.81 These two recent
arrivals to the New World replaced their brethren in November 1745. Their attempt to effect religious
conversions within the new reduced towns would severely test their faith and preconceptions.82
Their first stop in the Darién was at the lands controlled directly by coronel Juan de Dios and
Andrés, the lere and capitán of Moreti. These villages were four days distant from the Spanish town of El
Real de Santa María, and subsequently almost never visited by Europeans. Juan de Dios and capitán
Andrés clearly wanted to keep things that way, and after several minutes of consultation, Walburger
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decided that far-off Yavisa was the better site for his new reducción. The Jesuits sifted through the
Indians of the region, selected those willing to relocate under their tutelage, ultimately gathering a group
of indios reducidos numbering 197 souls. Upon reaching the Tuíra valley the two Jesuits split up, with
Walburger hoarding the entirety of their human cargo at Yavisa. Franciscis was left to settle at the village
of Paya, where the Sicilian Jesuit devoted himself to learning the Tule language and working to produce a
vocabulary and grammar of the language.83
Father Walburger produced a breve noticia that provided the details of his experiences in the
Darién and a striking record of the clash of European intellectual expectations with Tule realities.
Walburger’s breve noticia is notable in many ways, not least for its confrontation with Tule religious
beliefs and practices in the eighteenth century. His first paragraph provided an extensive description of
the geographical confines and borders of the province of Darién, while the next begins by informing the
reader that “the [Indians’] religion is filled with superstitions and blasphemies.”84
Walburger went on to report that the Indians described their divinity as residing in the heavens,
sitting on a small bench of gold, dressed in silver and gold, his neck, hands, and feet adorned with corals
and glass beads. The divinity resided in a house constructed of silver and gold and adorned with mirrors
inside, and even his hammock was of woven gold. The god had in his service Indians of the Darién who
provided him, from time to time, food and chicha in gold vessels. The divinity was unaware of what
occurred on the earth, and learned of terrestrial occurrences only when a Tule Indian died and informed
him of recent terrestrial events.85
This account, in spite of a condescending and mocking tone, conforms remarkably to conceptions
of the Kuna creator deity which modern anthropologists have conveyed.86 Modern Kuna believe that
divine beings in the spirit realm have entirely different physical and corporeal characteristics to go with
their distinct status, and practitioners of the healing tradition are required to learn a different language
with which to communicate with these beings.87 Walburger’s assertion that the Indian god needed to be
told what had occurred on earth, therefore, appears less ridiculous when interpreted in this light.
Walburger’s relation also described an Indian conception of the Spanish god as a separate entity
from the Indian god. The Spanish divinity, he had reportedly been told, understandably loved the Spanish
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more than he did the Indians, and at times in heaven the two deities engaged in battle. The Indians
believed that most of the time the Indian god got the better of the Spanish one, but that he retaliated for
any celestial defeats by inflicting pestilence upon the lands and animals of the Indians. At the time
Walburger was writing his noticia, the Darién’s Indians were experiencing waves of disease and increased
interaction with the Spanish and other outsiders, thus the story of contesting deities fit the social and
political realities which attended the Spanish attempts to subjugate the Indians.
Walburger remarked that the ritual specialists whom the Tule called leres were the big men of the
settlement, adding for his most likely readers that the people “give these men much respect and credit, as
Christians do prelates.”88 The Austrian Jesuit recognized that if the Indians believed their creator-god
was ignorant of events taking place in the physical world, then the men possessing the ability to
communicate with the beings living in the spiritual realm had to be esteemed as very important men. “If
something goes amiss, or someone gets sick, or if something goes awry in the loyalty of the Indians of the
band, this requires the consultation of the lere, the principal voice in the town.” But communication with
a spiritual realm brought forth a familiar enemy. Walburger angrily reported that the major function of
these pillars of the community was their frequent consultation with the devil, “whom they conceived to be
very practical, and knowledgeable of everything.”89
The Jesuit stated that the Indians freely admitted and reveled in their intimate association with the
prince of darkness, whom they found to be quite helpful to them. For example, if an Indian lost an animal
or a valuable item he said that a nia had taken it, and it was as clear as day to Walburger that the Tule nia
was nothing more than the Catholic devil. The present-day San Blas Kuna believe a nia to be a
particularly malevolent spirit being which delights in inflicting harm upon a person’s purpa, or vital spirit.
A nia can only be seen, communicated with, and convinced to depart by an Indian ritual specialist, or
lere.90 English-speaking visitors also made note of unsolicited avowals by Indian ritualists that they
conjured the devil in order to heal the sick or to see the future.91 Rather than linguistic evidence that the
Tule had internalized or incorporated crucial elements from Spanish belief system, as has been argued
more appropriately for mid-colonial Mexico,92 I believe that the Indians’ use of the Spanish term demonio
to stand in for the Tule nia was the result of a simple maneuver of translation.93
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When missionaries began to indoctrinate the Indians in the early seventeenth century, they had
obviously substituted the Spanish term demonio for the Tule words nia and purpa, and Tule speakers of
Spanish throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries soon felt free to use the terms
interchangeably. The easy substitution of the term demonio for nia and vice versa on the part of bilingual
leres was proof that the Catholic priests had not been able to convince the Indians of the malign and base
nature of the devil. More sustained religious instruction might have driven out such a free usage of the
term nia. Its continued usage, coupled with the very existence of the leres as religious specialists,
provided substantial proof, if more was needed, that missionary preaching and indoctrination had not
progressed far in the Darién.
Walburger’s breve noticia provided ample evidence of the cultural power and influence of the
leres in eighteenth-century Tule society. The Jesuit, explaining the strong hold which “superstition” had
on the Indians, attributed this fact to the “leres, to whom they give so much respect and credit.”94 In local
Tule society, the leres were clearly the men who mattered most. The men the Spanish termed capitanes
and caciques were important, and served the vital function of mediating the villagers' relationships with
the rapidly changing outside world, but it was the leres who ensured the community’s metaphysical
equilibrium and preserved Tule oral traditions. In a clear delineation of the direction in which Tule power
flowed, Walburger reported that the leres instructed the chiefs, “teaching them the things of the times
since the Spanish arrived.”95
In the colonial world of the Jesuit reducción of Yavisa, where Indians from several disparate
villages had been collected, Walburger described his misfortune at having no less than four leres in
residence in the town. These men, he wrote ruefully, “incited hatred and abhorrence for the things of the
church,” and, subsequently, “very few ever came there.”96 Although Walburger had begun indoctrinating
the Indians by teaching the children of Yavisa how to pray, his “pleasure was short-lived, for the leres
undid all the work I had done.”97 According to the Jesuit, the ritualists informed Walburger’s charges that
hell was not to be feared, for it was a place for the Spaniards, not the Indians; the leres argued that the
priest’s admonitions were specific to the Jesuit alone, and did not apply to his Indian students.98
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Walburger claimed that the four leres concentrated their efforts and conjured for eight days in an
attempt to call down a fatal fever upon him, and when this failed, they conspired to lure him away from
the town and into the distant mountains where he could easily be killed. The leres planned to inform
Walburger that a sick child requiring his attention there could not be moved, but luckily for the priest a
sympathetic Tule woman informed him of the plot.99 From this point forward, Walburger noted, the leres
hated him irreconcilably, and obstructed all that he attempted to do, going so far as to re-baptize the
children to whom the priest had administered that sacrament. The leres, no doubt weary of the Jesuit’s
incessant talk of demons and Satan, began publicly mocking the Jesuit priest, calling him chui mor chichi
or devil in black dress.
Walburger failed to combat the power of the leres, or to make inroads into the Tule way of
thinking, and he soon came to recognize the truth of the oft-mentioned comment that those Indians who
sought baptism in the Darién did so solely to receive Christian names.100 While some of the Indians who
had heard his teachings did call for him moments before their deaths, they did so, he reported, only to be
assured that they would see their relatives after they died. Walburger noted despondently that these
seekers of the sacrament had no understanding whatever of the doctrine and perceived the rite in purely
mechanistic terms. Whatever the reasons, in two years and eight months of religious work, Walburger
had performed just sixty-three baptisms. Of these, fifty-two had been performed on children, who were
by definition unable to make up their own minds about whether to accept or reject the rite.101
In the penultimate section of the breve noticia, Walburger’s honest description illustrated the utter
defeat of his mission. He reported that he was no longer able to convince even those Tule Indians nearest
to death to convert, with the dying Indians informing him to his face that they would never believe in the
efficacy of the doctrines which he preached to them. The leres had transformed Walburger into so
marginal a figure that the townspeople not only made open fun of him, they also held the rites he
practiced up to public ridicule.102
The leres deployed popular contempt and mockery as weapons against the priest, entertaining the
Indians by acting out rueful pantomimes of the sacraments. On one occasion Walburger discovered the
leres performing the mock-baptism of a live lizard and several recently-killed animals, and he looked on
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in horror as they intoned the phrases of the Latin rite in colloquial Tule.103 The priest suffered the
ultimate humiliation one afternoon when he returned to the church after having been lured away from the
altar in the midst of the mass to find the leres at the altar brazenly carrying out a mockery of the mass,
adding ridiculous barbs and jests to the order of the Church’s most sacred ritual.104
The Jesuits operating contemporaneously in New France used their knowledge of astronomy and
medicine to discredit and ridicule indigenous ritual specialists.105 By casting into doubt the claims of
these men to have direct contact with the sacred, the Jesuits deployed their scientific knowledge in order
to strengthen their own claims to divine power. In the North American case, the Jesuits often successfully
turned laughter against the North American shaman, whom they believed they had unmasked as nothing
more than a rattle-waving charlatan. In the Darién the situation was reversed and the leres mocked the
doctrines of the Catholic faith and used ridicule as a weapon in a wide-ranging, tenacious, and effective
program to discredit the Jesuit priest living amongst them.
Walburger’s handling of a lunar eclipse in February 1747, which could have been utilized as
proof of the priest’s command of sacred knowledge, became mired in the dynamic which had already
fixed his status within the village community. The Jesuit reported that he had heard a great uproar the
night the moon disappeared. The townspeople, rather than seek his counsel, turned instead to the leres,
who retired together and concluded after some consultation that the eclipse was not a message from the
Spanish god, but was instead a sign that had been sent for them. The leres, not Walburger, provided the
villagers with an explanation of the event’s meaning, informing them that the Indian god was angry, had
displayed his anger by smashing the moon, and would make the Indians pay for their transgressions by
taking the life of one of the principal leres.106
As if on cue, one of the ritual specialists, capitán Andrés, became ill soon thereafter. Several
months earlier presidente Alsedo had hoped to transform Andrés from a Tule lere to a indigenous capitán.
Andrés’s interaction with Walburger proved that the process of hispanicization would require a more
concerted effort. Walburger consulted with the stricken man, and the Jesuit claimed that although Andrés
had renounced his ritual practices he still would not accept baptism. When asked by Walburger to
repudiate his many wives in order to die a member of the church, Andrés responded firmly that he could
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never renounce the women since he fully expected to enjoy their company in heaven after he died. The
capitán-lere abruptly ended their discussion of the Catholic faith by informing Walburger that, no, he did
not fear death, since he was assured that “only the Spanish went to hell, while the Indians went straight to
heaven.”107
Taking this utterance into account, it is unclear whether Walburger had in fact convinced the
capitán-lere to renounce his practices at all, for, as he reported, “he still consults the other leres, and errors
are spread.”108 This comment refers to the fact that several of the Christian concepts with which
Walburger had been trying to convert Andrés had been passed by Andrés to the other Indians in
significantly changed forms. Andrés’ case was the closest thing Walburger presented to a conversion
narrative in the breve noticia, but the events ran counter to the traditional tropes that his readers would
have expected. Andrés, facing death and certain damnation, did not repent and acknowledge the truth of
the faith. Quite the opposite had occurred, in fact. Andrés’ refusal was a clear signal that Walburger’s
failure was complete: he could not educate the young, adults were indifferent to his teachings, and the old
and the dying ignored him as well.
The Perils of Tribalization
The starkly divergent experiences of Fathers Álvarez and Walburger illustrate the themes of this
paper. Álvarez aimed primarily to convert and consolidate the indigenous leadership of the Darién; the
leaders would then bring to the faith the people over whom they exercised authority. Álvarez was
attempting to enact the tribalization of an indigenous people through the baptism and Christianization of
the men whom he considered to be their leaders. Although such a strategy was problematic, the
pageantry presided over by Alsedo in Panamá City was not just an empty display. By taking part in the
ritualized activities, cacique Juan de Dios and capitán-lere Andrés became versed in the ritual, language,
and forms required of Spanish indigenous leaders.
Alsedo’s assessment of the Spanish strategic situation had forced the issue of Indian religious
conversion to fuse with that of the tribal leaders’ loyalty to the crown, and the Tule capitanes, who had
been dealing with outsiders for decades, accepted the challenge laid down by the new colonial regime. In
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accepting the faith, Juan Sanni and Juan de Dios also accepted the benefits and responsibilities attending
provincial rulers in the Spanish empire. Presidente Alsedo expected the Indian leaders to lead their pagan
subjects to the Catholic faith, never understanding that the caciques had known when they swore fealty to
the crown that their ability to force the Tule villagers to convert was extremely limited.
The men and women who actually wielded social power within the isolated Tule communities of
the Darién interior had been entirely absent from Alsedo’s calculations. While the men Alsedo called
caciques had been accruing political power on a colonial and provincial level, the leres, the ritual
practitioners who transacted the sacred business of the people, continued to organize and preserve Tule
villages at the local level. Hidden from the eyes of the Spanish or the other European intruders, the leres
wielded power in the communities which comprised the indigenous isthmus, at the same time that tribal
leaders such as Juan de Dios forged and managed the community’s relationships with outsiders. The dual
nature of Tule political power eluded observers such as the presidente, just as it had eluded the other
European intruders, the buccaneers and the Scots. Ironically, Father Walburger’s bitter first-hand
experience made him one of the few European men who got close enough to discern the true nature of
local Indian power.
The Tule had made clear to the Austrian Jesuit that none of the answers he provided to the
questions confronting the community could supplant those offered by their own system of belief presided
over by the leres. Walburger’s time amongst the Tule occurred while the Indians were ravaged by
disease, a situation which could have led to a loss of faith in the native healers if they failed to provide
relief or protection against illness. Instead the Tule blamed the priest by correlating the missionary’s
arrival directly with the onset of the sickness.109 The leres retained their place in the cultural hierarchy,
dealt effectively with indigenous concerns regarding illness, and discredited the isolated Jesuit priest
living in their midst. They explained that the malevolent Spanish god had caused the catastrophic illness
because of his implacable hostility toward the Tule and their god. This theory provided the explanation
for the destructive and visible effects of disease on the community and tarred the Jesuit as a pestilential
outcast, making the leres even more vital and central to the community. Ironically, Walburger was
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recognized as a sacred specialist by the leres who learned about him and his creed. But they believed him
to wield a malevolent form of power that he derived from a divinity of minor importance.
Walburger ended his breve noticia with a warning to the Spanish authorities. Greater resources
and different tactics would be necessary to defeat the demonic forces that had taken root in the Darién.
To make matters worse, the British, who made no attempt to correct the abominable errors of the Tule,
sold them guns and other materials and had consequently become highly esteemed by tribal leaders such
as Miguel of Calidonia. These dangerous men had gone so far as to send their children to Jamaica to
receive their education, and in the Darién, Walburger noted ruefully, it was not allowed “for a bad word
to be spoken against [the British].”110 Experience on the ground had forced Walburger to the conclusion
that missionization needed to be coordinated with a larger imperial project aimed at bringing untamed
regions with the core areas of the Spanish empire.
Walburger described the sources of opposition to his mission as comprising more than the
tenacious, demonic leres who presided over the Tule rituals. While it was certain, he argued, that the
dealings of the leres with the devil had dragged the Indians inexorably towards eternal damnation, the
Jesuit concluded that the tribal leadership, rather than Satan, was the core of the problem. The Indian men
who had so recently given solemn professions of their faith had, in short order, renounced their oaths.
Juan de Dios was a great disappointment. Walburger concluded that he had come to the Spaniards “only
for the silver they offered him.”111 Any policy based upon treating the cacique as a representative of
Christian authority seemed doomed to fail, especially since the apparently promising Juan de Dios had,
Walburger alleged, seen fit to murder Spaniards prior to the signing of the treaties. It would be a very
long time, the embittered Jesuit advised his superiors, before the Darién would resemble the other settled
provinces of the Spanish empire.
In this assessment Walburger’s thinking fell wide of the mark, as it had in several other respects.
For in the end it would not matter whether Juan de Dios, or others like him, had truly accepted the
Catholic faith into his very heart, since the roots of the failure of Alsedo’s policy lay not within the
unfathomable soul of a Juan de Dios, but rather deeper within the complicated indigenous polity. The
presidente had in fact succeeded in establishing a nominally Christian provincial ruling structure for the
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Darién, an achievement that was no small feat. But Alsedo was unaware that the ruling structure upon
which he had placed his imprimatur lacked the coercive capacity, and perhaps the inclination, to
challenge or transform the power that the leres wielded in the village communities. The Tule caciques
and capitanes, even if they had desired to do so, lacked the ideological and physical resources that they
needed to transform the religious life of the Tule people.
Padre Jacobo Walburger died amongst the Tule in 1751, no doubt contemplating until the end of
his days the profound failure of his ministry.112 By the mid 1750s Juan de Dios, who had so recently
raised himself from a local village leader to the office of the Darién’s cacique, would also become a
casualty of the Spanish failure in the Darién. Having used his cunning and ambition to climb to the apex
of the nascent system of Spanish regional rule, he had left himself nothing to hold onto when that system
crumbled beneath him. As late as 1754 Juan de Dios plaintively addressed a memorial to the presidente
and the bishop of Panamá City, writing that the absence of missionary activity amongst his people was a
matter of grief and concern to him. He did “consider [it to be a] great lack ... to have a town without a
doctrinero,” or missionary priest. Even after he had lost the confidence of the administrators, Juan de
Dios still thought it worth his while to petition the presidente on these matters.113 In a sign of their
inability to grasp the workings of indigenous power, Spanish officials in Panamá City held Juan de Dios
responsible for the system’s collapse, rather than listing him, with Walburger and the Jesuits, as one of its
victims.
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